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Abstract
Background: Global pandemic influenza preparedness relies heavily on public health surveillance, but it
is unclear that current surveillance fully meets pandemic preparedness needs.
Methods:  We first developed a conceptual framework to help systematically identify strategies to
improve the detection of an early case or cluster of novel human influenza disease during the pre-pandemic
period. We then developed a process model (flow diagram) depicting nine major pathways through which
a case in the community could be detected and confirmed, and mapped the improvement strategies onto
this model. Finally, we developed an interactive decision tool by building quantitative measures of
probability and time into each step of the process model and programming it to calculate the net
probability and time required for case detection through each detection pathway. Input values for each
step can be varied by users to assess the effects of different improvement strategies, alone or in
combination. We illustrate application of the tool using hypothetical input data reflecting baseline and 12-
month follow-up scenarios, following concurrent implementation of multiple improvement strategies.
Results: We compared outputs from the tool across detection pathways and across time, at baseline and
12-month follow up. The process model and outputs from the tool suggest that traditional efforts to build
epidemiology and laboratory capacity are efficient strategies, as are more focused strategies within these,
such as targeted laboratory testing; expedited specimen transport; use of technologies to streamline data
flow; and improved reporting compliance. Other promising strategies stem from community detection –
better harnessing of electronic data mining and establishment of community-based monitoring.
Conclusion:  Our practical tool allows policymakers to use their own realistic baseline values and
program projections to assess the relative impact of different interventions to improve the probability and
timeliness of detecting early human cases or clusters caused by a novel influenza virus, a possible harbinger
of a new pandemic. Policymakers can use results to target investments to improve their surveillance
infrastructure. Multi-national planners can also use the tool to help guide directions in surveillance system
improvements more globally. Finally, our systematic approach can also be tailored to help improve
surveillance for other diseases.
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Background
As the world confronts the extensive spread of influenza
A/H5N1 virus among animals and the growing number of
cases in humans, it has an unprecedented opportunity to
prepare for the next human influenza pandemic. Many
experts feel that the world is overdue for such a pandemic.
Since the pandemics of the past century (1918, 1957,
1968), the world has become more globalized in terms of
travel and trade, thus facilitating greater extent and speed
of disease spread. At the same time, however, the world
has also become more experienced in addressing emerg-
ing infectious disease threats.
Among the many priority activities related to pandemic
preparedness, most experts would agree on the critical
role played by public health surveillance, defined as "the
ongoing systematic collection, analysis, interpretation
and dissemination of data regarding a health-related
event for use in public health action to reduce morbidity
and mortality and to improve health" [1], or more simply:
systematic information for public health action. The Insti-
tute of Medicine has noted that "The importance of sur-
veillance to the detection and control of emerging
microbial threats cannot be overemphasized" [2].
In the context of pandemic preparedness, surveillance is
critical for the early detection and timely response to con-
tain or limit the spread of novel human influenza viruses
to which humans have no immunity, such as A/H5N1 or
other strains that may yet emerge. Global preparedness is
strengthened when surveillance systems in all countries
are capable of detecting early cases of novel human influ-
enza within their borders. Pandemic preparedness guid-
ance from the World Health Organization (WHO) [3] and
the U.S. Government's recent National Strategy for Influ-
enza Preparedness – Implementation Plan [4] both include
prominent attention to global surveillance and detection.
The WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network is a
longstanding surveillance program whose traditional
focus has been the monitoring of influenza virus strains,
principally for purposes of determining the appropriate
formulation for each season's influenza vaccine. How-
ever, it is unclear how well this system would serve the
need for reliable early detection of novel influenza cases
that might be a harbinger of an emerging pandemic [5-7].
Therefore, it makes sense to examine possible ways to
improve global influenza surveillance, specifically pre-
pandemic surveillance to detect early human cases or clus-
ters caused by a novel influenza virus wherever they may
occur, before the disease spreads and triggers a pandemic.
Moreover, approaches to improve global influenza sur-
veillance could also have implications for surveillance
and early detection of other diseases.
This study addresses two questions: What are the key ele-
ments of influenza surveillance? How might investments
in them lead to improvements in reliable and early detec-
tion? In this paper, we describe a quantitative decision
tool that we developed to help policymakers assess the rel-
ative effects of improving different elements of their influ-
enza surveillance system. The tool is based on a process
model (or flow diagram) that depicts the nine major path-
ways through which a novel influenza case could be
detected and confirmed. We identified potential improve-
ment strategies, mapped these onto the relevant steps in
the model, built in quantitative input measures of proba-
bility and time that users can vary for each step depending
on the strategy chosen, and programmed the model to cal-
culate the net probability and time required for each
detection pathway. This allows policymakers to use the
tool to compare the probability and timeliness of detec-
tion for each of the detections pathways, assess the impli-
cations of specific elements of their surveillance system,
and project realistic improvements over time. The intent is
to help the user identify targeted investments to improve
surveillance. To help extend the reach of internal efforts to
improve surveillance systems, we also describe opportuni-
ties for policymakers to leverage partners to help improve
their surveillance coverage, quality and timeliness. Using
these approaches – the decision tool and opportunities to
leverage partners – we identify a number of practical ways
to help improve global influenza surveillance. While the
work described here was conducted for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services to help guide its glo-
bal influenza surveillance programming, our goal was to
develop a tool that is broadly applicable around the
world.
Methods
To develop a conceptual framework that could facilitate
the identification and organization of potential improve-
ments in global influenza surveillance, we first reviewed
guidance published by the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention to glean criteria for evaluating public health sur-
veillance systems and to create a simplified framework
representing a core set of surveillance requirements. We
then sought and reviewed published reports from any-
where in the world for evidence or suggestions regarding
improvements to influenza surveillance. We searched the
MEDLINE database using such search terms as "influ-
enza", "surveillance", "early", "warning", and "detection",
alone or in combination. Based on review of reports iden-
tified through this search, we identified and organized
improvement strategies into a conceptual framework
according to three core attributes: surveillance coverage,
quality and timeliness.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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Using process mapping, a method derived from work in
engineering, we next developed a process model (or flow
diagram) to show nine different "detection paths", and
the steps for each, through which a case in the community
could be detected and confirmed. We mapped all of the
improvement strategies from the conceptual framework
onto the process model. We then developed an interactive
tool by building in quantitative measures of probability
and time to each step of the process model and program-
ming it to calculate the net probability and total time for
each of the nine detection paths. The tool allows users to
input their own values for various program elements (cor-
responding to steps in the model) and see the resulting
impact on the likelihood and timeliness of detection – via
each different detection path – of a confirmed case of
influenza caused by a novel virus strain in the community.
Because there is not sufficient evidence on which to base
estimates of the performance of the detection paths as
they currently exist in most countries, we use a set of plau-
sible hypothetical estimates, including documented plan-
ning assumptions when available, to illustrate the use of
the tool.
Results
Conceptual framework to organize potential improvement 
strategies
Based on our review of the literature and guidance docu-
ments [3,8-10], we identified three core surveillance sys-
tem attributes that served as the basis for identifying and
organizing potential improvement strategies:
￿ Coverage – includes a broad range of reporting sources
and the range of information reported
￿ Quality – requires accurate information based on stand-
ards, trained personnel and quality-assured laboratory
testing
￿ Timeliness – includes rapid detection methods, data
flow, analysis, and dissemination to trigger a timely inves-
tigation and response to limit or delay disease spread
From our review of published reports, we also identified
potential strategies to improve surveillance in these core
areas. We identified thirteen strategies in all: four to
improve surveillance coverage, three to improve quality
and six to improve timeliness (Table 1):
Coverage
Strategies to improve surveillance coverage can include
increasing the number of traditional reporting sites such
as clinics and hospitals participating in surveillance
reporting [11,12], addition of new types of sites or infor-
mation reported [11,12], and community-based report-
ing, i.e., not from medical facilities [4,13]; increased
reporting compliance can further improve coverage from
all reporting sources.
Quality
Strategies to improve surveillance quality include broad
efforts to improve epidemiology and laboratory capacity
for investigation and diagnosis [10,11,14], plus targeted
laboratory testing so that potentially scarce laboratory
resources are used efficiently [11,12].
Timeliness
Strategies to improve the timeliness of surveillance
include better use of data mining [12] such as the Global
Public Health Intelligence Network or GPHIN which
scours electronic media reports for clusters of bird die-offs
or human deaths [15], expedited transport of specimens
[4], streamlined notification and analysis [10-12], imple-
mentation of active surveillance when appropriate [12],
wide deployment of more accurate rapid diagnostic tests
[10,14,16], and deployment of trained Rapid Response
Teams to investigate suspicious cases or clusters [4]
Process model identifying the paths to detection and 
confirmation
The sequence of steps in the process model is depicted in
Figure 1. It begins with a case or cluster of disease in the
community caused by a novel influenza virus and ends
with detection and laboratory confirmation.
We identified entry points through which a case might be
detected, which in turn lead to further steps that must
occur so that information is passed along and the case is
eventually confirmed. Impediments at any step can mean
that detection or confirmation of the case is less likely or
delayed. The first six paths begin when a sick individual
seeks medical care, through either a doctor/clinic or a hos-
pital; these generally reflect traditional surveillance
approaches. The last three paths do not depend on the
individual seeking medical care.
Many of these paths lead to an 'Investigation Sequence,' a
series of activities that might be triggered by reports of sus-
picious cases or clusters. For example, the Investigation
Sequence may be activated when sub-national health
authorities receive reports of influenza-like illnesses from
doctors, hospitals, communities or other sources. They, in
turn, may notify national health authorities, one or the
other of which may begin an epidemiological investiga-
tion, which includes the collection of a sample for testing.
All of the paths eventually lead to a 'Laboratory Sequence',
a series of steps for testing that ultimately results in labo-
ratory confirmation of a suspicious case. The Laboratory
Sequence may be triggered either by the Investigation
Sequence, or may be triggered directly by a healthcare pro-BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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vider who orders a laboratory test for an ill individual. In
the Laboratory Sequence, the sample is first tested to iden-
tify the presence of an influenza virus and possibly the
virus type. The sample may be sent for further testing at a
more sophisticated laboratory or tested further at the
same laboratory.
A quantitative tool for comparing surveillance strategies
Based on this process model, we developed an interactive
decision tool (see Additional file 1). We first built in
quantitative measures of probability and time: Each of the
steps along the pathways described above has an associ-
ated likelihood, or probability, of occurring, conditional
Table 1: Thirteen strategies to improve influenza surveillance
Description
COVERAGE: Seek international cooperation and comprehensive surveillance
(1) Increase the number/density of traditional reporting sources
Increasing the number of traditional reporting sources, e.g., doctors, clinics, hospitals, would increase the percentage of the population covered through 
surveillance.
(2) Develop community-based alert and response systems
Community-based surveillance systems would help increase coverage by capturing information on illnesses within the community that may not otherwise 
reach government attention.
(3) Incorporate new human disease sources and signals
Gaps in surveillance coverage could potentially be addressed through reporting from new sources (e.g., workplaces, schools, local media, web logs) and new 
signals (e.g., work or school absenteeism, rumors of compatible cases or outbreaks, or local reports of surge in hospital demand).
(4) Increase reporting compliance
Assuring the regular voluntary reporting of cases by various surveillance sources (doctors, hospitals, communities, businesses, etc.) assures that the 
surveillance system in place captures information from all designated reporting sites, thereby improving coverage.
QUALITY: Build capacity for accurate, actionable information
(5) Improve human laboratory sample preparation and diagnostic capacity
Laboratory diagnosis confirms the occurrence of influenza disease and is an important element of surveillance quality; this strategy involves the development 
and deployment of standard laboratory protocols, training, and regular proficiency testing.
(6) Implement targeted laboratory testing appropriate to the pandemic phase and location
Potentially scarce laboratory resources can better assure quality services when they are not overwhelmed by demand; criteria for targeted testing, e.g., 
clinically compatible cases with specified epidemiologic risk factors, should be widely disseminated to and applied by clinical providers.
(7) Improve epidemiologic capacity
Training in surveillance and applied epidemiology will help improve surveillance quality, including analysis and interpretation of surveillance data and 
investigation of suspicious cases.
TIMELINESS: Ensure rapid case detection, reporting and response
(8) Use data mining methods for early warning
Capitalizing on data mining methods, such as the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), which employs data mining techniques to 
systematically scour the electronic news media in multiple languages worldwide for reports of disease occurrences and then process to help discern "signal" 
from "noise" (14), can improve the timeliness of influenza surveillance.
(9) Expand expedited transport of specimens to in-country and international reference laboratories
Efforts must be scaled up to assure that specimens anywhere in the world can reach an international laboratory in timely fashion; rapid transport of 
laboratory specimens from their point of origin (the sick individual) to the first and any subsequent in-country laboratories is also critical.
(10) Streamline notification, analysis and reporting
Transmission of surveillance data between sub-national and national levels should employ the efficient modalities and channels; reporting electronically or 
even by telephone should be the desired global norm for surveillance of diseases for which timeliness is a particular priority, including human cases of avian 
influenza, and electronic technologies should be harnessed for streamlined data processing and analysis.
(11) Implement active surveillance when appropriate
While active surveillance, in which government authorities directly solicit information about disease occurrence from potential sources such as hospitals and 
clinical providers, is more labor intensive than routine approaches in which such providers submit reports at regular intervals, selective use of active 
surveillance can be critical to enhance timeliness of case detection.
(12) Develop and deploy rapid laboratory diagnostics with greater sensitivity and reproducibility
The development and widespread deployment of more accurate rapid diagnostic tests, including tests that could identify influenza virus subtype, could 
improve the timeliness of influenza surveillance.
(13) Develop and deploy in-country and international Rapid Response Teams to investigate cases/outbreaks
The development and deployment of in-country and international Rapid Response Teams can improve the timeliness of surveillance by triggering rapid 
investigation and subsequent control measures.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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upon the occurrence of preceding steps. Each step also has
an associated time required for its completion. At any step,
the process can fail to occur altogether or can cause delay
in reaching the goal of laboratory confirmation. Achieve-
ment at each step, of course, is also dependent on the
availability of personnel and resources in a given setting.
Therefore, the tool was designed so that users can input
their own estimates of the likelihood of occurrence (prob-
ability) and time required for completion of each step.
Moreover, these values can change over time, e.g., if sur-
veillance programs are improved through implementa-
tion of the various improvement strategies. We mapped
the 13 surveillance improvement strategies described ear-
lier onto the process model. Each strategy affects one or
more steps in the model by increasing the probability that
a step occurs and/or decreasing the time required to com-
plete it.
The decision tool allows the user to input quantitative
estimates of probability and time for each step in the sur-
veillance process; the tool then calculates the net proba-
bility (product of the sequential probabilities in each step
along a given path) and total time (arithmetic sum of time
required for each step in the path) to reach the final step
of laboratory confirmation. Policymakers can apply actual
data and realistic projections from their own countries to
compare different surveillance strategies and potential
improvements to elements of their surveillance systems:
They can compare 'baseline' and projected 'follow up' sce-
narios, i.e., after implementation of selected surveillance
improvement strategies. Such quantitative assessment can
help policymakers focus their investments on surveillance
activities with the greatest promise to improve the proba-
bility and timeliness of detection of cases or clusters of
disease in the community caused by a novel influenza
virus.
An example using the decision tool
We illustrate the use of the decision tool with a hypothet-
ical example in which all of the 13 surveillance improve-
ment strategies are implemented over the course of a year
in a typical developing country setting. As described
Process model: Pathways and steps toward detection and confirmation of a novel case or cluster of human influenza in the  community Figure 1
Process model: Pathways and steps toward detection and confirmation of a novel case or cluster of human 
influenza in the community.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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above, this is a common interval for assessing public
health program progress. Because there are very scant data
on specific country influenza surveillance systems and we
could not identify quantitative global planning assump-
tions, e.g., from WHO, we inputted estimated values for
probability and time which are based on relevant docu-
mentation, when available (e.g., planning assumptions
from the U.S. National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Implementation Plan, data from U.S. sentinel surveillance
systems, U.S. data on numbers of physicians and hospi-
tals, current times required for laboratory testing), and on
the views of the study team regarding plausible estimates
for a developing country setting. The first set of input val-
ues represents hypothetical 'baseline' conditions; the sec-
ond reflects projected 'follow-up' values that might be
obtained if all 13 improvement strategies are imple-
mented over 12 months with projected quantitative tar-
gets for each step in the process model. The tool can be
used both to strategically plan for implementation and to
document achievements.
Figure 2 demonstrates the use of the tool by depicting our
hypothetical input values for the baseline (current system)
and follow-up (post improvement) periods for each part
of the surveillance sequence. In this example, multiple
improvement strategies are implemented concurrently –
as reflected by changes between baseline and follow-up
input values for steps in each detection path – i.e., more
doctors order diagnostic laboratory testing, more doctors
and hospitals are added to the sentinel surveillance net-
work, active surveillance is implemented, worker sick days
and electronic media are better tracked, community-based
surveillance is implemented, reporting compliance from
all sources increases, epidemiologic infrastructure is
strengthened so that investigation of rumors is more
likely, specimen transport is expedited, and laboratory
Illustrative example of the decision tool: Input values for the likelihood (probability) and timeliness (in days) of each step in the  process model, for baseline and one-year follow up Figure 2
Illustrative example of the decision tool: Input values for the likelihood (probability) and timeliness (in days) 
of each step in the process model, for baseline and one-year follow up.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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infrastructure is strengthened so that testing is more likely
and quicker. The tool then calculates the net probabilities
and total time for the nine detection paths, i.e., to reach
the final laboratory confirmation step through each path-
way.
For purposes of demonstrating the model, we made the
following assumptions about baseline and follow-up
input values for selected steps in the model:
￿ We held constant at 50% the probability that the sick
individual will seek medical care from a doctor (4), and at
10% the probability of seeking care from a hospital.
￿ We also held constant the delay in seeking care from a
doctor or hospital, since we do not propose a strategy to
increase patient demand for services (we used a low esti-
mate of a 1-day delay in seeking medical care, but this can
be held constant at a higher level, which would result in
that additional number of days through each of the rele-
vant detection paths).
￿ Since we wished to examine the strategy related to
streamlined timing of notification rather than the level of
reporting compliance from local to national public health
authorities, we held constant at 100% the probability of
reporting by local authorities to national authorities.
￿ Since such investigations routinely include laboratory
testing, we held constant at 100% the probability of order-
ing of lab tests as part of case or outbreak investigations.
￿ Finally, since we handled the variability in probabilities
for laboratory testing by varying the probability that a
specimen is sent to each laboratory, we also held constant
at 100% the probability that samples received by labora-
tories are tested.
We also used the same baseline and follow-up values for
compliance in reporting by all local reporting sources, i.e.,
the percent of designated reporting sites that submit sur-
veillance reports at a pre-defined "regular" interval:
￿ The probability of compliance is projected to increase
from 50% at baseline to 75% at follow-up for community
reporting sites and from 30% to 90% for clinical reporting
sites
￿ We assume a constant 3-day delay in reporting from all
sites, reflecting the average delay within a weekly report-
ing system.
The tool calculates the probability and time required for
each of the nine detection paths, under the two scenarios
(baseline and follow up). Table 2 shows the net output val-
ues calculated by the tool for our hypothetical example,
and the resulting increases in probability and decreases in
time required for each detection path between baseline
and projected follow up.
To provide a better understanding of how the tool works,
we describe the process for three of those paths in greater
detail.
Table 2: Comparison of influenza surveillance improvement strategies: Baseline and follow-up output values for hypothetical example
Baseline Follow-up
Probability (%) Time (days) Probability (%) Time (days)
Detection from clinical sites
Path 1 Doctor orders laboratory test 0.15 23 16.0 15
Path 2 Hospital orders laboratory test 0.03 23 5.1 15
Path 3 Reporting by sentinel doctor 0.0 30 2.6 23
Path 4 Reporting by sentinel hospital 0.0 30 4.2 23
Path 5 Active surveillance of doctors 0.0 30 8.6 23
Path 6 Active surveillance of hospitals 0.0 30 4.6 23
Detection from community sites
Path 7 Tracking of employee sick days 0.0 35 8.6 28
Path 8 Tracking of electronic media 0.03 41 43.2 34
Path 9 Detection by community-based monitoring system 0.01 43 10.8 36BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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Path 1: Doctor orders laboratory test
Based on the steps and input values shown in Figure 2, at
baseline this requires an individual to:
￿ seek medical care (50% probability, 1 day delay),
￿ then for the doctor to order a diagnostic laboratory test
(10% probability and 1 day delay),
￿ then for the laboratory sequence to unfold – sample is
tested for influenza type (100% probability, 1 day),
￿ then it is sent to the next laboratory for subtype testing
(10% probability, 3 day delay),
￿ the subtype testing is undertaken (100% probability, 3
day delay),
￿ then the sample is sent for confirmatory testing (30%
probability, 4 day delay), and
￿ the confirmatory testing is completed (100% probabil-
ity, 10 day delay).
The product of the sequential probabilities is: 0.5 × 0.1 ×
[laboratory sequence: 1 × 0.1 × 1 × 0.3 × 1] = 0.0015, or
0.15%, as reflected in Table 2. The total time for this path
at baseline is the sum of the delays or time required at
each step: 1 + 1 + [laboratory sequence: 1 + 3 + 3 + 4 + 10]
= 23, also as reflected in Table 2.
For the follow-up scenario, we assume:
￿ Interventions to sensitize doctors to order diagnostic
laboratory tests result in an increase by 5-fold in the per-
centage ordering such tests (input values increase from
10% to 50%).
￿ Interventions to strengthen the epidemiology and labo-
ratory infrastructure result in an increase in the probabil-
ity that samples are tested and a decrease in the time
needed to perform the testing.
As a result, the sequential probabilities are: 0.5 × 0.5 ×
[laboratory sequence: 1 × 0.8 × 1 × 0.8 × 1] = 0.16, or 16%;
and the total time is 1 + 0 [same day] + [laboratory
sequence: 0 + 1 + 1 + 2 + 10] = 15. This represents an
increase from 0.15% to 16% in the probability of detect-
ing the case, and a reduction in time from 23 to 15 days.
Path 3: Doctor is in sentinel network
Here, the requirements at baseline are for the individual
to:
￿ seek medical care from a doctor (50% probability, 1 day
delay),
￿ for the doctor to be part of the country's sentinel surveil-
lance system (1% probability),
￿ for the doctor to file the routine surveillance report
(30% probability, 3 day delay),
￿ for the investigation sequence to unfold, including an
epidemiologic investigation (30% probability, 3 day
delay), and then for the laboratory sequence to unfold as
described above.
The serial probabilities are: 0.5 × 0.01 × 0.3 × [investiga-
tion sequence: 1 × 0.3 × 1] × [laboratory sequence: 1 × 0.1
× 1 × 0.3 × 1] = 0.00001, or 0.001%; the total time
required at baseline is: 1 + 3 + [1 + 3 + 1] + [1 + 3 + 3 + 4
+ 10] = 30.
At follow up, after interventions to increase by 10-fold the
percentage of doctors in the sentinel surveillance network
(from 1% to 10%), improve reporting compliance 3-fold
(from 30% to 90%), and improve the epidemiology and
laboratory infrastructure, the probability of detection
increases to only 2.6%.
Path 8: Tracking of electronic media
This path depends on information about a case or cluster
in the community appearing in any electronic media or
communications that can be tracked using electronic data
mining methods such as the GPHIN system described
below. Here, the main change between baseline and fol-
low up is a hypothesized 20-fold increase, from 5% to
100%, that media reports are tracked. The serial probabil-
ities of detection at baseline are: 0.75 × 0.05 × [investiga-
tion sequence 0.3] × [laboratory sequence: 0.03] = 0.0003,
or 0.03%; and at follow up: 0.75 × 1 × [investigation
sequence 0.9] × [laboratory sequence 0.64] = 0.43, or
43%. The savings in time, from 41 to 34 total days, comes
exclusively from the 7 days reduced for the laboratory
sequence.
These three examples highlight a number of important
observations. First, sensitizing doctors to order diagnostic
tests on suspicious patients is an efficient pathway in
terms of assuring that the first doctor seen orders a test
and also in bypassing the investigation sequence, but this
path still depends on the individual seeking medical care.
Second, as shown in the Path 3 example above, traditional
sentinel surveillance has a number of important "filters"
that together can impede the probability of case detection
and confirmation. Third, a community-based strategy
such as electronic data mining is not subject to the "filter"
of the sick individual seeking care from and beingBMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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reported by a doctor or hospital. Indeed, any pathway that
relies on a sick individual to report to a doctor or hospital
for medical care and subsequent reporting is subject to a
substantial early "filter" – U.S. national planning assump-
tions are based on only 50% of such individuals seeking
medical care, and this figure is likely much lower in devel-
oping countries. Thus, this step alone greatly reduces the
probability of detection. Seeking to increase this health
seeking behavior may overwhelm clinical facilities and
may or may not result in significant improvements in like-
lihood of detection. Finally, as shown in Figure 2 and
Table 2, reporting compliance for any system is also a
potentially significant "filter", but potentially one that can
be addressed through targeted program efforts. In this
example, we projected a three-fold increase in compliance
from sentinel providers (from 30% to 90%), and a 1.5-
fold increase (from 50% to 75%) from community
sources. The net probabilities of detection thus increase by
this magnitude based on this factor alone.
Examination of the logic model and outputs for all paths
in our illustrative example of the tool thus suggests a
number of potentially valuable strategies to improve
influenza surveillance:
￿ Laboratory – Because all nine detection paths include the
Laboratory Sequence, slow execution of this sequence or
failure of a sample to be accurately tested jeopardizes the
effectiveness of all the preceding paths. Therefore, imple-
mentation of the three strategies related to improving lab-
oratory diagnosis (improving laboratory diagnosis
through training, equipping and proficiency testing; expe-
diting specimen transport; and widely deploying rapid
diagnostic tests) will simultaneously improve the proba-
bility and timeliness of case detection for all nine paths.
￿ Epidemiology – The Investigation Sequence also stems
from a number of detection paths (3 through 9); there-
fore, the strategy to improve reporting compliance and the
two strategies specifically related to the Investigation
Sequence (improving epidemiologic capacity through
training in applied epidemiology; streamlining notifica-
tion, analysis and reporting through use of electronic and
other appropriate technologies) are all critical to increase
the probability and timeliness of case detection arising
from multiple detection paths.
￿ Tracking electronic media – Surveillance methods that do
not require the sick individual to seek medical care avoid
this important "failure point" associated with the first six
paths in our model, which reflect traditional surveillance
systems. The use of data mining methods to track the vast
amount of electronic media with potentially valuable
information about the occurrence of suspicious disease in
a community greatly improves surveillance coverage and
timeliness. It is easy, quick, and inexpensive to implement
because at least one such system currently exists (GPHIN)
and can be enhanced with add-ons, e.g., to expand the
range of foreign languages tracked [15].
￿ Targeted laboratory testing – The first six paths in our
model stem from a sick individual seeking medical care
from a doctor/clinic or hospital. Targeted laboratory test-
ing by the initial health care provider involves widely dis-
seminating guidelines to sensitize clinical providers to
order influenza diagnostic laboratory tests for appropriate
clinical cases [11,12]. This strategy is easier to implement
widely and, in our hypothetical example, produces better
probability and timeliness of case detection compared to
alternative strategies related to clinical visits, i.e., sentinel
reporting or active surveillance. Also, since there are fewer
hospitals than physicians and sicker patients are more
likely to go to a hospital, perhaps the first priority should
be to sensitize the clinicians at all hospitals to appropriate
guidelines for ordering laboratory testing for suspected
cases of novel influenza.
￿ Community-based monitoring – Perhaps the most difficult
pathway, at least in terms of public health implementa-
tion, is case detection through community-based moni-
toring systems. Establishing such systems is labor
intensive and will require extensive mobilization and edu-
cation of communities throughout a country and will also
take more time (probably measured in years) than some
of the other interventions [13]. Once established through-
out a country, however, community-based monitoring
systems can provide more comprehensive surveillance
coverage for influenza, as well as for other diseases and
conditions. Moreover, WHO has described the limitations
of surveillance in resource-poor settings and commented
that "Mobilizing communities to report unusual health
events ... is the simplest form of cluster surveillance" [17].
Seeking partnerships to improve surveillance systems
Government health authorities can implement the 13
potential surveillance improvement strategies on their
own, drawing upon their resources as well as guidance
from WHO. However, working with strategic partners out-
side their own system provides important opportunities
to leverage partnerships to further improve the coverage,
quality and timeliness of their influenza surveillance sys-
tem and thereby further increase the probability and time-
liness of case detection. Specific opportunities for such
strategic partnerships are described below.
Strategies to improve surveillance coverage are inherently
oriented toward the local level. Therefore, organizations
whose activities are primarily at the grassroots or local
level might be particularly well suited as strategic partners
for national planners to help improve surveillance cover-BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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age. Failure to leverage such partners can mean greater
effort and resources required on the part of national plan-
ners, lower levels of coverage at a given time, or delays in
achieving broader coverage. Examples of potential part-
ners include development agencies, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and even local businesses.
Strategies to improve surveillance quality include build-
ing laboratory and epidemiology capacity and targeted
laboratory testing. Technical agencies with laboratory
and/or epidemiology capacity are of potential strategic
value to help improve international surveillance quality.
Examples include academic institutions, Ministries of
Health from other countries, development agencies, tech-
nically-oriented NGOs, international laboratory net-
works, and the Training in Epidemiology and Public
Health Network. For example, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services now has a formal agreement
with the Institut Pasteur to partner on improving labora-
tory capacity in selected countries, beginning in Southeast
Asia [18].
Strategies to improve the timeliness of surveillance
include expedited transport of laboratory specimens
within countries and from countries to reference laborato-
ries, streamlined notification and analysis, and wide-
spread deployment of rapid diagnostic tests.
Technologically oriented businesses, academic institu-
tions, and technical government agencies might be well
suited strategic partners in this core surveillance area.
Discussion
WHO has noted that "One of the most important func-
tions of surveillance is to ensure the detection of unusual
clusters of cases and of the occurrence of human-to-
human transmission at the earliest possible stage, when
public health interventions have the greatest chance to
prevent or delay further national and international
spread" [17]. Our study focused on ways to better assure
early detection of such cases. We systematically identified
possible strategies to improve coverage, quality and time-
liness of global influenza case detection. We developed a
process model onto which we mapped the strategies, built
in quantitative measures of probability and time and pro-
grammed the model to allow users to vary input values for
these measures and to calculate serial probabilities and
total time for each detection path. This is the decision tool
that permits comparison of different paths for case detec-
tion and different strategies to improve specific surveil-
lance system processes. Examination of the process model
and outputs from the tool revealed some strategies that
are consistent with traditional public health practice and
others that represent more novel approaches. These sug-
gest that traditional sentinel surveillance is not designed
to reliably detect early cases of a new disease in the com-
munity, and point instead to other detection paths that
may be more suitable for pre-pandemic surveillance, espe-
cially community-based approaches. However, tradi-
tional efforts to build epidemiology and laboratory
capacity are worthwhile, including more focused efforts
within these, e.g., targeted laboratory testing through sen-
sitization of doctors; expedited specimen transport; use of
technologies to streamline data flow; and improving
reporting compliance. Our model and published field
studies suggest that rapid diagnostic tests also appear
promising for surveillance purposes [14,16]. Finally,
while several previous studies have noted the importance
of early warning systems for timely case detection
[12,19,20] and have described different ways to use real
time electronic data streams [10,12,21,22], the robust use
of electronic data mining for surveillance early warning
remains a newer approach that has not yet reached its full
potential for public health.
This study has both limitations and strengths that should
be recognized. First, in our hypothetical example to illus-
trate application of the decision tool, we focused on
potential improvements to surveillance systems. We
acknowledge that some changes over time can weaken
surveillance systems, e.g., due to economic decline or
major disaster. Second, in the absence of identifiable glo-
bal guidance, e.g., quantitative planning assumptions
from WHO, or a suitable evidence base from a specific
developing country, we relied on planning assumptions
largely from the United States and the judgments of the
study team to generate the hypothetical input values used
to illustrate the decision tool. Thus, the outputs suggest
potential rather than evidence-based benefits of the vari-
ous surveillance approaches examined. The strengths of
the study include our systematic approach to consider a
broad range of potential improvement strategies, includ-
ing traditional facility-based and newer community-based
surveillance approaches and specific elements within
these; and the development of a process model and deci-
sion tool that permit quantitative comparisons of alterna-
tive improvement strategies – improvements to specific
elements in the surveillance process – implemented singly
or in combination. Our novel approach can guide influ-
enza surveillance programming in new and practical ways
in countries around the world. This type of approach also
can be applied to help improve surveillance for other dis-
eases.
Conclusion
Decision makers can apply the tool described here to their
own programs – using baseline measures (or estimates)
and planning targets – to assess the relative merits of and
realistic expectations from implementation of the differ-
ent surveillance improvement strategies, and thus select
the ones that are most promising in their own context.BMC Public Health 2008, 8:186 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/8/186
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This information can inform program policy and guide
strategic investments to improve country surveillance sys-
tems within the larger context of global pandemic prepar-
edness.
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